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INTRODUCTION

"Separation of powers" is a difficult doctrine. Few principles are so basic
to American notions of democracy, yet so misleading. Few principles seem
more vital in theory, yet more feeble in practice. Textbooks tell us that the
Constitution is founded on a separation of powers; strictly speaking, it is not.
In its opinions, the Supreme Court consistently pays homage to separated
powers; yet, in its decisions, often ignores them. In their speeches, public
officials pay lip-service to this principle; yet, in their actions, work hard to
overcome it.

Like so much else in the Constitution, the American brand of separated
powers is a compromise-a "practical piece of work for very practical
purposes" 2-a balance between the conflicting values of efficiency and accountability, concentrated power and diffused power. A central concern of
the Framers was, of course, to prevent tyranny-to protect individual liberties
from the depredations of government. The task was to devise a constitutional
system which served their purpose. The liberal political "science" of the eighteenth century, drawing largely on Locke and Montesquieu, seemed to offer a
solution. 3 If concentrated power encouraged tyranny, it followed that its
* Professor of Law and Policy Sciences, Director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public

Affairs, Duke University.
t Research Associate, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University.
I. Farrand, for example, calls the Constitution a "bundle of compromises." He writes:
"The document which the convention presented Congress and to the country as the
proposed new constitution for the United States was a surprise to everybody. No one
could have foreseen the processes by which it had been constructed, and no one could
have foretold the compromises by which the differences of opinion had been reconciled,
and accordingly no one could have forecast the result.
M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 200-01 (1968).
2. Id.at 201.
3. That the Framers saw themselves as being engaged in a "scientific" rather than a "theoretical" project is one of the most striking aspects of their work.
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opposite-divided and dispersed political power-would discourage it. As
Montesquieu wrote: "When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty;
because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate enact
4
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical way."
Madison seemed to concur: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny. '5 Rational analysis, then, had suggested a solution: a separation of powers, an allocation of functions to distinct branches of
government, coupled with clear rules to prevent one branch's encroaching on
the prerogatives of the others.
Yet this problem could not be dismissed quite so easily. Experience in politics taught the Framers that a strict separation of powers was as likely to promote tyranny as to prevent it. Power, after all, was tied to function. Complete
independence in performing designated functions implied unbridled, and
possibly abusive, power. Power, then, would not be the "check to power" 6 that
Montesquieu had proposed. Each branch could "spin independently and
freely in its own orbit."7
Thus most of the Framers conceded that a rigid separation of powers was
unacceptable. Madison, for example, commented on "the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments. "' He
went on to embrace the principle of the New Hampshire Constitution, which
held that government powers should be separated only as far as "the nature
of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
unity and amity." 9
Therefore, instead of separated powers-shared powers.10 Instead of divided government-mixed government.1 1 Accordingly, Madison was forced to
reinterpret Montesquieu, to find in his work support for the idea of shared
powers. Thus Madison argued that, in Montesquieu's call for separated pow-

4. Comment, Delegation of Legislative Power-the Constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970, 10 Duq. L. REV. 431, 432 (1972) (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (T.
Nugent trans. 1949)).
5. Madison, The Federalist, No. 47, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1964).
6. Comment, supra note 4, at 431 (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 150 (T.
Nugent Trans. 1949)).
7. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 2 (1972).
8. Madison, supra note 5, at 304.
9. Id.
10. See K. LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 34-37 (1957).
Loewenstein contends that the separation of powers doctrine is "obsolete and devoid of reality."
Instead, shared powers is the basis of liberal constitutionalism in the modern world.
11. FISHER,.supra note 7, at 241-43.
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ers, he "did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency
in, or no control over, the acts of each other.""2 Rather, Montesquieu meant
Only that "when the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department the fundamental
13
principles of a free constitution are subverted."
The product was a constitution, not of separated powers, but of "separated institutions sharing powers."1 " The institutions of government were
formally separated by the stricture that no member of one branch could
simultaneously hold office in another. 15 To an extent, the powers of government were separated as well: the three branches were allocated particular
functions over which they held primary responsibility. But most importantly,
powers were shared. Dual concurrence, for example, was required for
policymaking. Through his ability to convene and adjourn Congress,16 recommend 1 7 and veto" legislation, the President acts formally as a lawmaker. 19
Through its grant of authority and funds, and its exercise of oversight
and investigation, Congress contributes to administration. These facts are
familiar enough. The key point, however, is this-that it is shared powers,
rather than separated institutions, which promotes the value of "checks
and balances," and thus limits the governmental threat to individual liberties.
As a description of the actual functioning of government, then, the term
"separation of powers" is quite misleading.20 Indeed, it seems fair to say that
the constitutional commitment to this doctrine has been, at best, "vague and
uncertain." 2 Granting this, what significance does the separation doctrine

12. Madison, supra note 5, at 302.
13. Id. at 302-03.
14. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1961).
15.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
16. U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § 3.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
19. President Eisenhower used to assert, "I am part of the legislative process." See NEUSTADT,
supra note 14, at 33.
20. Gibbons, The In terdependeoce of Legitiiay: An Iotroduction to the Meiang of Sepa ration of
Power.s, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 436 (1974).
21.
Parker, The Hi toric Basi. of Adnittitrative Low: Separatiopi of Power atd Judicial Supretacy,
12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 465 (1958). Indeed, the extent of this commitment has been so vague
that we should probably begin to ask some new questions. That is, given the actual comnmitment
to shared powers, how is it that separation of powers became so quickly and deeply entrenched in
popular myth? Why do judges, political leaders, and commentators persist in using the term to
characterize the constitutional framework? In this regard, it is interesting to look again at THE
FEDERALIST, No. 47. There, Madison was concerned to defend the constitution against some of
its critics-in particular, against those "more respectable adversaries to the Constitution" who
believed that it violated the "political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciatry departments ought to be separate and distinct." Set Madison, -sipa note 5, at 301. In other words, even
then, it was apparent that the Constitution was not strictly enforcing a separation of powers.
In his early commentaries on the Constitution Justice Story observed that the framers "... endeavored to prove that a rigid adherence to separation of powers in all cases would he subversive
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have? Jaffe argues that "separation of powers has probably always been understood to be an expression of a general attitude, rather than an inexorable
table of organization. So understood it is a valuable element of political
wisdom."2 2
Corwin is more precise in analyzing this "general attitude." He adduces
three "core principles" in the idea of separated powers: First, that the three
functions should be reciprocally limiting; second, that each department
should be able to defend its characteristic functions from intrusion by either
of the other departments; and third, that none of the departments may abdi23
cate its powers to either of the others.
Of course, even this account is a bit loose. The Constitution provides little
help in setting strict limits-in defining illegitimate intrusion and abdication.
It allocates functions and powers broadly, but leaves considerable room for
political struggle. Most of the weapons which it issues to the participants are
familiar enough: presidential recommendations, congressional vote; presidential veto, congressional over-ride. Some weapons, however, are at best implicit
in the Constitution, but have been developed to great effect by the contending branches. If Congress appropriates too much, the President can impound
the funds. If it appropriates too little, he can transfer or reprogram the
money from other sources.2 4 If Congress fails to act at all, the President can
often achieve the same result by issuing an executive order. Congress can use
its committees and the Government Accounting Office to investigate executive
administration; the President may claim executive privilege to resist those
efforts.

25

Congress can demand to exercise its right to "advise and consent" in

foreign policy; the President can establish executive agreements to elude that
demand.26 Congress can delegate considerable authority to executive agencies,
and then try to control executive actions with committee vetoes, or override
them entirely through concurrent resolutions. 27 As a last resort, Congress can
use the threat of impeachment to curb executive encroachment. Perhaps the

of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties." See
FISHER, slupra note 7, at 2 (quoting, 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 396 (5th ed. M. Bigelow 1891)).
22. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-29 (1965).
23. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 9 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
24. See Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretioi aod Congressional Controls, 37 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROn. 135, 147-155 (1972); M. GREEN, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 116-121 (1975); and Church, Inpoundlen/ of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congressional Control over Executive Discretion, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1240 (1970).
25. See Berger. Executive Privilege v. Congressional lnquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REX. pt. 1, at 1044,
p. 2. at 1288 (1965); Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (1974).
26. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV., 33-44 (1972).
/1 IFederal
"
Ad1miistration by Congression1al Resolutions and Comm ittees,
27. See Gin nane, The Control
66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Cogressionnal Control of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
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only power which the President lacks is that of dissolving Congress entirely
and calling new elections .

2

In this paper, we want to look more closely at but one of the weapons in
the arsenal of presidential-congressional conflict-the executive order. Executive orders have become the most important means of presidential legislation. As such, they are central to an analysis and critique of separated
powers. Many commentators see executive orders as subverting the vitality of
the Constitution. For some, they represent a dangerous trend in executive
usurpation.2 9 For others, they reflect a continuing policy of congressional
abdication. 30 For still others, they are prompted by an inappropriate judicial
31
deference toward the executive.
The popularity of such criticisms, however, should not preclude further
analysis. The continuing use of executive orders as a lawmaking tool prompts
questions from several perspectives. The constitutional lawyer is likely to ask:
Do Presidents have the authority, under the Constitution, to issue executive
orders? If so, over what sorts of issues or policy areas? Does Congress have
the authority to delegate its powers to the executive branch? If so, according
to what standards or guidelines? The political scientist will ask somewhat different questions: First, the analytical problem: What, exactly, do we mean
when we speak of "presidential power" in relation to Congress? Then: Has
this power increased in significant ways? Have executive orders played a part
in that trend? Why has Congress apparently been eager to delegate its legislative power to the executive branch? Finally, the reformer will want to ask: Do
executive orders undermine American democracy? Do they violate the dual
concurrence which the Constitution prescribed for legislation? If so, what can
be done about it?
This paper is an attempt to raise and respond to some of these questions.
In examining the constitutional issues, we shall develop a framework for
analyzing the validity of executive orders, in general, and then apply it to
orders in two specific areas of domestic policymaking, civil rights and
economic stabilization. This analysis will suggest a central conclusion: Although the courts generally uphold executive orders, these orders have in
some cases been of-at best--dubious constitutionality. On some occasions,
Presidents have issued orders without specific statutory authority, only to have
the courts find it for them. On others, Congress has delegated power to the
executive so broadly that the President has lacked adequate standards with

28. This weapon is not unique to parliamentary systems. The constitution of the French Fifth
Republic grants the President the right to dissolve the National Assembly and Senate.
29. See Remmert, Executive Order 11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.A. J. 1037 (1969).
30. See M. GREEN, supra note 24, at 135-138.
31.

See Velvel, Judicial Abdication on Separation Powers: Wage-Price Freeze Act, 29 NAT'L LAW.

GUILD PRAC.

95 (1972).
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which to work. The subsequent executive orders have, accordingly, been
without clear statutory basis.
In considering the political issues, we shall focus on the role of Congress
in national policymaking. In particular, we shall try to explain the congressional policy of broadly delegating legislative power to the executive. Such an
account will result from looking at the political incentives faced by individual
Congressmen. This analysis will suggest two conclusions: First, that contrary
to the conventional wisdom of the 1960's,32 Congress exerts significant influence over national policy. Nevertheless, this fact is to be distinguished from
the care it takes in formulating that policy. On this score, the critics of Congress are correct; the legislative branch has been quite lax. Second, in some
cases, executive orders are as much a reflection of presidential weakness, as of
presidential strength. In other words, Presidents may decide to legislate by
executive order when they have failed to move desired bills through Congress. This poses a problem for democratic theory, however, since it is precisely in those instances where the President legislates by order-when he has
previously failed or expects to fail in Congress-that executive orders may be
least acceptable.
There are two main threats to the doctrine of separated powers-usurpation and abdication. To the extent that any branch falls prey to either of
those dangers, the federal government can not be self-limiting. Executive
orders, then, are a critical test for the separation doctrine, and a challenge to
the integrity of the Constitution.
I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL

A.

CONTEXT

Background: Definitions and Use

It somehow seems fitting that the first case in modern constitutional law,
Marbury v. Madison,3 3 should have been provoked by an executive order. Executive orders have always been central to the tension between branches of
government. Only since the New Deal, however, have they received much
popular and scholarly attention.
Interestingly, we still lack a precise definition of executive orders. The
only statute on the subject, the Federal Register Act of 1935, 3 4 calls for the
publication of all executive orders, but fails to define them. There have been
several executive orders providing instructions for the publication of orders
and proclamations,3 5 yet none attempts a definition.
32.

See, Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Centosv, in THE CONGRESS

AND

33.

5 (D. Truman ed. 1965).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

34.

49 Stat. 501 (1935), 44 U.S.C. 1505 (1970).

35.

The Order currently in effect is Exec. Order No. 11030, 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963) (com-

AMERICA'S FUTURE

pilation), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 1505 app., at 11081 (1970).
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Commentators have attempted, without complete success, to remedy this.
They have been hard pressed, in particular, to distinguish executive orders
from presidential proclamations. One writer, for example, "classifies" as executive orders "all directives of the President which are directed to, and govern actions of, government officials and agencies. '36 Such orders, then, have
only an "indirect" impact on private citizens. In contrast, presidential proclamations are directed at the individual citizen; the), have a "direct" impacta 7
But, since Presidents are more limited in their power to command citizens
directly, proclamations are almost always hortatory or ceremonial in design.
Unfortunately, Presidents do not always follow this neat distinction. President
Kennedy's naval blockade of Cuba, for example, was implemented under a
presidential proclamation, rather than an executive order.,
There is still a further problem with this definition. In command of a
huge federal establishment, Presidents are constantly issuing orders to executive agencies and personnel. Yet, only a fraction of these commands are
codified in the Federal Register as executive orders, presumably because of
their weightier policy content. Unfortunately, the statutes, executive orders,
and commentators all fail to provide any guidance on this question. Indeed,
the definition just cited precludes any distinction between verbal and written
commands, codified and uncodified executive orders. 39 In this paper, we can
do little but note these definitional problems. We shall, however, be restricting
our analysis to published executive orders with clear legislative intent and impact.
40
Valuable, brief histories of executive orders have appeared elsewhere.
Several points merit inclusion here. Franklin Roosevelt used executive orders
most frequently. 41 Although subsequent Presidents have reduced the number

of executive orders, they have broadened their scope. Since Franklin
Roosevelt, Presidents have used executive orders to special effect in several
policy areas, most notably civil rights, economic stabilization, and the gathering and protection of national security information. In each of these areas,
recent Presidents have greatly extended the initiatives originally taken by
Franklin Roosevelt.
In the area of civil rights, for example, Roosevelt began in World War II
36. Cash, Piesidetial Powier: Use and E iurlcement (!/ Executive Orders, 39
(1963-1964).
37.

Id.

38.

Pres. Proclamation No. 3504, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1959-1963 Compilation).

39.
40.

Cash, supia note 36.
See Keenan. Executive Ordels: A Brie

Them, in SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
93d CONG., 2d SESS., EXECUTIVE
print 1974);

of their Use and the Ppesidends Power to Issue

ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS.
ORDERS IN TIMES OF W AR AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Neighbors, Presideiitial Legislation by Executive Oider, 37 U. COLO. L.

109-112 (1964).
41.

His/loo'

NOTRE DAME LAW. 44

See Keenan, supra note 40. at 40-47.

20 (Comm.
REV.

105,
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by declaring a national policy of nondiscrimination in hiring for government
and defense industries.4 2 This was followed, in 1948, by President Truman's
order to desegregate the armed services, 4 which led in turn to a series of
broader executive orders enforcing nondiscrimination in government sponsored housing programs, 44 "affirmative action" in minority employment by
private businesses working under government contract, 45 and most recently,
even stronger "preferential treatment" in minority hiring by government
contractors.

46

Similarly, modern experience with economic controls can be traced to
World War II. Working under the "unlimited emergency" 47 created by the
War, President Roosevelt used executive orders to establish, first, an Office of
Price Administration 4 8 and then, an Office of Economic Stabilization,

49

grant-

ing them broad authority to regulate prices, wages, and profits. 50 Almost
thirty years later, President Nixon drew on this precedent to create, by executive order, during the relative peace of the 1970's, an even more elaborate
bureaucracy for economic controls. 5'
Finally, the modern growth of the American intelligence establishment has
been authorized almost entirely by executive directive. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, was established by the National Security Act of
1947. This Act endowed the Agency with primarily "ministerial" functions,
but gave the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence" as the President "may from
time to time direct." 52 Since that time, the intelligence activities of the CIA
have been controlled and its administration restructured by a series of presidential directives, only some of which have been made public and codified as
executive orders. For example, in 1967, an executive order was used to prohibit the CIA from giving any "covert financial support" to any educational or
voluntary organization.5 3 In 1973, Executive Order 11652 reformed the system for classifying information in the possession of the federal intelligence
42.

Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation).

43.
44.
45.
46.

Exec.
Exec.
Exec.
Exec.

Order
Order
Order
Order

No.
No.
No.
No.

9981, 3 C.F.R. 772 (1943-1948 Compilation).
11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 Compilation).
10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation).
11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation). A useful account of pres-

idential use of executive orders in the area of civil rights is R. MORGAN, THE PRESIDENT AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: POLICY-MAKING BY EXECUTIVE ORDER (1970).

47.

Pres. Proclamation 2487, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1938-1943 Compilation).

48.
49.

Exec. Order No. 8734, 3 C.F.R. 921 (1938-1943 Compilation).
Exec. Order No. 9250, 3 C.F.R. 1213 (1938-1943 Compilation).

50.

Exec. Order No. 9328, 3 C.F.R. 1267 (1938-1943 Compilation), placed ceilings on wages

and commodity prices.
51.
Exec. Order No. 11615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation); Exec. Order 11627, 3
C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation).
52. Memo Said to Cast Doubts of Legaliot of CIA's Actio,,s, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, at 1, col. 4, 35,

col. 7.
53.

Marwick, Reforming the Intelligeoce Ageocies, 1 FIRST PRINCIPLES No. 7, at 9 (1976).

PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION

Page 1: Summer 1976]

agencies. 54 In 1976, President Ford, used Executive Order 11905 to impose a
series of restrictions on intelligence activities and enact procedures for render-

ing the intelligence agencies accountable to the President. 55 Taken together,
the directives in this executive order comprised what the President called "the
'
first major reorganization of the intelligence community since 1947. 156
It is apparent, then, that through the use of executive orders, Presidents
can initiate important public policies. The question is whether those policy
initiatives are constitutional.
B.

Sources of Authority

Analysis of executive orders must begin with Article II of the Constitution.
This article provides for the executive power of the federal government, but
is constructed rather more loosely than article I, which provides for the legislative power. Thus one is forced to wonder whether the vesting
of "executive
power" in a "President of the United States of America"' 7 merely confers a
title or, instead, assigns a broad set of powers. Presidents, themselves, have
disagreed in their response. Taft, for example, is associated with a "constitutional theory" of presidential power-a narrow interpretation of article 11.58
In contrast, Theodore Roosevelt advocated a "stewardship theory" of the
Presidency-that "every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was steward of the people, and not to content himself
with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. '59 For
54. Id. at 7; Exec. Order No. 11652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 Compilation).
55. Exec. Order No. 11905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976 Compilation).
56. Center for National Security Studies, President Ford's Intelligence Proposals: A Charter for
Abuse, 1 INTELLIGENCE REPORT 1 (1976). It should also be noted that, between 1960 and 1974, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted over 500,000 separate intelligence investigations of
American individuals and groups suspected of being subversive. There was no clear statutory
authorization for such action. Instead, the Bureau claimed that authority had been provided by a
series of presidential measures, including an oral statement by Franklin Roosevelt in 1936, written directives in 1939, 1943, 1950, and 1953, and executive orders in 1953 and 1971. There is
some doubt, however, whether any of these measures authorized the specific kinds of investigations undertaken by the Bureau. For discussion of this point, see Theoharis, The FBI's Stretching of
Presidential Directives, 1936-1953, 91 POL. Sci. Q. 649 (1976); FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the
Subcoinn. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Coniimittee
on the Judiciary- , 94th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., pt. 2, 2-31, app (1975-1976) (statement of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General); Berman,
The Case for a Legislated FBI Charter, I FIRST PRINCIPLES No. 10, at 3 (1976).
57. U.S. CONST. art. II. § 1. cl.1.
58. In his book, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS, Taft wrote: "The true view of the
executive functions is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which cannot be
fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within
such express grant as proper and necessary." E. CORWIN, supra note 23, at 153 (quoting W.H.
TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 139-40 (1916).

59. Id. (quoting T. ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1919)). Roosevelt goes on to note his
"insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and
prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional
powers. . . . My belief was that it was not only [the President's] right but his duty to do anything
that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or
by the laws."
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Taft, the President had power to act only with specific authorization. For
Roosevelt, he had power to act whenever there was no specific prohibition
against doing so.
Presidents since Franklin Roosevelt, with the possible exception of Eisenhower, all appear to have held to some theory of presidential "prerogative."
This is typified by the startling assurance of Franklin Roosevelt that, "In the
event that Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the
responsibility, and I will act."6 0 The pleadings of Assistant Attorney General
Baldridge before the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer 6 ' and of Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman before the Senate
Special Committee on Watergate 62 expand on this theme. The claim is that
article II confers on the President certain "inherent powers"-a "residuum of
power . . . which authorizes him . . . to take such actions as he may deem to
be necessary .... '
The courts have been forced to face this claim several times. Their general
approach has been interesting. They have consistently invoked the narrow
"constitutional theory" of President Taft, yet have often been both generous
and ingenious in finding sources of authority for executive action. 6' The
courts have, however, rejected the boldest claims of the "inherent powers"
argument. From the set of limitations imposed by the Supreme Court, we can
develop an analysis of individual executive orders.
The majority opinion in Youngstoun provides a useful starting point. The
issue was the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 10340, by which President Truman had ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate
most of the country's steel mills in order to avert a nationwide strike of steel
workers. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Black was quite explicit in asserting that, "The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
'6 5
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."

60.

Neighbors, supra note 40, at 109 (quoting F. Roosevelt's Labor Day Address to Congress,

88 CONG. REC. 7052, 7054 (1942).
61. The Court asked Mr. Baldridge, "So you contend the Executive has unlimited power in
time of an emergency?" He replied, "He has the power to take such action as is necessary to meet
the emergency.- See Comment, Iuherewt Presidential Power: Proiecion or Usuwpation?, 3 SAN FERN.
V. L. Rsv. no. 1, 59, 63 (1974).
62. /d. at 76-81. This argument can actually be traced back to Hamilton, who argued generally that, "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government."
E. CORWIN, supra note 23, at 15 (quoting A. HAMILTON, FEDERALIST No. 70, 198 (Fairfield ed.
1966)). According to Corwin, Hamilton believed ". . . first that the opening clause of Article II is
a grant of power; secondly, that the succeeding more specific grants of the article, except when
'coupled with express restrictions or limitations,' 'specify the principal articles' implied in the
general grant and hence serve to interpret it.. " Id. at 179.
63. See Comment, supra note 61, at 65 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 103 F.
Supp. 574 (D.D.C. 1952), (If'd 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
64. See notes 118-124 inlra and accompanying text.
65. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 585 (1952).
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C.

Constitutional Authorization

Authorization for executive orders, then, must be either direct or implied
in an act of Congress or the Constitution. What are the specific conditions
which might confer such authority? Several sections in Article 1I of the Constitution have been taken to authorize executive orders.66
First, of course, is section I-that "executive power be vested in a President of the United States." We have already mentioned the difficulty of interpreting this clause. 67 Twentieth century Presidents have typically called for
a broad construction of the clause, using it to justify both executive orders
without specific congressional authorization 68 and executive privilege. 69
The second relevant portion of article II is section II, clause I: "The
President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several states when called into actual service of
the United States."7 0 This clause has been used to justify a number of important executive orders. For example, Franklin Roosevelt's internment of Jap71
anese Americans appealed specifically to the Commander-in-Chief clause,
as did Truman's order to desegregate the military.7 2 In Youngstown, the Solic73
itor General also invoked the Commander-in-Chief clause.
A full analysis of the Commander-in-Chief clause and its relevance to presidential law-making is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that, in
using this clause to authorize executive orders, one must draw several distinctions. First is between military personnel and civilian populations as objects of
the order. Second is among de jure war, de facto war, and peace as timings
for the order. Third is between the domestic and foreign arenas as settings
for the order. The President's authority under the Commander-in-Chief
clause seems strongest when exercised over military personnel involved in a
declared war against a foreign power. It seems more dubious, however, when
applied to civilian populations, as with Lincoln's revocation of habeas
corpus," or Roosevelt's internment policy, 75 or during de facto, rather than
66. This analysis will attempt to indicate the extent to which specific constitutional provisions
offer authority for executive orders. This task is complicated by a basic problem: Presidents often
appeal to the supposed authorization of two or more constitutional provisions (often coupled with
congressional authorization, as well). In such cases, it is difficult to discern the precise role of the
individual clauses.
67. See notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text.
68. See 343 U.S. at 587.
69. See note 25 supra.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
71. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1943).
72. See note 43 supra.
73. In Youngstown, however, this appeal to the Commander-in-Chief clause was explicitly rejected. See 343 U.S. at 587.
74. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); 6 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 18 (1897). See also The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863) (The Prize Cases).
75.

See note 71 supra.
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declared war, as with Truman's seizure of the steel mills.
President Lincoln contended that the Commander-in-Chief clause, combined with the "take care" clause gave him a broad "War Power" to be exercised in times of national emergency. This position was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Prize cases.7 6 Succeeding Presidents have adopted Lincoln's
constitutional argument, although never acting quite to his extreme. They have
been assisted both by Congress' tendency to delegate power generously during times of perceived national emergency, and by its hesitancy to terminate
declared emergencies.

77

The third significant portion of article II is section III, the provision that
the President "take care that the laws be faithfully executed ....

-78 There

appear to be two basic applications of this clause. First is to create a role for
the President as the nation's "administrative chief.

' 79

Required by the Con-

stitution to implement specific policies set by Congress, the President may
then announce administrative commands through executive orders. Thus, at
the least, this clause simply authorizes the President to obey Congress. His
authority to issue orders under such conditions is well established. Indeed, it
is then at its strongest. As Mr. Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown, "When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. ' 80 When Presidents claim
express or implied Congressional authorization for their orders, the orders
themselves can be challenged on the grounds that they exceeded the intent of
Congress.8'

A broader interpretation of the "take care" clause is possible, however.
The clause, it can be argued, authorizes the President not simply to implement specific directives of Congress, but to enforce the laws in general.8 2
Thus the President enjoys considerable freedom to choose which among the
panoply of existing laws he will enforce, and when he will enforce them. In
the absence of Congressional authorization, the "take care" clause can be used
to bolster a theory of presidential stewardship. 8 As a result, "The President's
76.

See note 74 supra.

77.

'he national emergency declared by Truman during the Korean War, for example, was

not terminated until 1976. The National Emergency Act, enacted on September 14, 1976, ended
four different states of national emergency, one of which was first declared in 1933. In all, about

470 different statutes and presidential decrees had been enacted tinder the conditions of these
declared emergencies. See President Signs New Law Ending 4 States of National Emergencv, N.Y.
Times, September 15, 1976, at 24, col. 1.
78. U.S. CONST. art. lI, § 3.
79. See E. CoRWIN, supra note 23, at 69.
80.

343 U.S. at 635.

81. The two most notable, successful challenges have been YougStow7n and Cole v. Young, 351
U.S. 536 (1956).
82. See E. CORWIN, supra note 23, at 104.
83. In Yommgstowni, for example, the Solicitor General argued that the "take care" clause provided authority for the presidential seizure of the steel mills. See 343 U.S. at 646.
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duty 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed' becomes often a power
84
to make the laws."
The fourth important provision has a somewhat more ambiguous grounding in the Constitution. This is the designation of the President as the sole
representative of the United States in foreign affairs-that the President is
"exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs. 8 5
This principle has been accepted since at least the 1790's. Yet, the source of
this power is still not entirely clear. Is it inherent, constitutionally derived, or
delegated by Congress? The Constitution does grant the President some
power relevant to the pursuit of foreign policy-most notably, the power to
make treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate), 6 the power to
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,8 7 and the power to
receive ambassadors and other public ministers.8 8 At the same time, the Constitution reserves to Congress the right, among others, to regulate commerce
with foreign nations.8 9 Thus, despite the tradition of presidential responsibility for foreign affairs, the Constitution clearly grants Congress a major role.
One commentator sees it as according to Congress a "coordinate, if not dominant, role in the initiation of war, whether declared or not." 90 Moreover,
"control of commercial policy was largely assigned to Congress, and [the
Framers] thought that commercial relations would constitute a major portion
of America's overall relations with the world." 9 1
The President's powers in foreign affairs are greatest in the field of making treaties, as evidenced by the continuing use of executive agreements. Even
after the War Powers Act, 92 the President's ability to wage war, without a
formal declaration by Congress, remains formidable. In the field of foreign
commerce, however, Presidents have been forced to rely on delegations of
power from Congress. There are several examples. Perhaps most prominent
is Franklin Roosevelt's proclamation forbidding arms shipments to either
Paraguay or Bolivia in 1932, issued under the terms of a Joint Resolution of
93
Congress, and upheld in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.

84.

E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 152 (rev. ed. 1973).

85. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
87.

Id.

88.

U.S. CoNST. art. 1I, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.

89.
90.

Lofgren, United States v. Cirtiss- Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE

L.J. 1, 30 (1973).
91. Id.
92. See Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, 40 LAw AND CON-I ENP. PROB. no. 3,at
86 (1976).
93. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Pres. Proclamation No.
2087, 48 Stat. 1744 (1933-1934).
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Congressional Authorization

Congressional authorization for executive orders can be either direct or
implicit. Direct authorization will typically be expressed in statutory delegations. Implicit authorization has, on occasion, been inferred by the courts
from the fact of continued congressional inaction in the wake of executive
initiatives. With the former, the problem is to determine the constitutionality
of those delegations: does the statute represent an excessive, and thus unconstitutional, abdication of congressional authority? With the latter, the problem
is to discern congressional will: does congressional quiescence necessarily
imply acceptance of presidential action?
The theory of separated powers would seem to prohibit delegations of
power by any branch of government.9 4 Yet, a long line of court decisions
upholds the practice of delegation (although often seeming to cling to the
principle of non-delegation). 95 One need not trace this history to demonstrate
the validity of delegation. As Fisher observes, one need only look at the debates and performance of the Framers. Thus, at the Philadelphia Convention,
it was recommended that the executive carry out such powers "as may from
time to time be delegated by the National Legislature." But since the legislative power to delegate was thought to be implicit in the power to carry all laws
into effect, this claim seemed superfluous and was omitted. Moreover, delegations were carried out as early as the first Congress, which included, after all,
96
a number of the constitutional Framers.
The problem, then, is to determine, not whether Congress can delegate,
but what, exactly, and how much. The courts have continually faced these
questions, but their reponses have not been entirely consistent. Through the
nineteenth century, they simply denied the obvious-that Congress was delegating the power to make law. Thus, they argued, the executive was being
empowered simply to find facts or "fill up the details" 9 7 of congressional pol-

icy. Only in the twentieth century has the Supreme Court taken a different
position. The two transitional cases are Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) and J.W.
94. Commentators have typically seen the non-delegation doctrine as logical corollary of separation of powers. A recent analysis, however, suggests that the origin of the presumption against
delegation lies, instead, in the doctrine of constitutional supremacy-the "simple expectation in
the constituent act of establishing government that neither the government nor any of its parts
should change the constitutional arrangement of offices and powers." See S. BARBER, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 36-37 (1975).
95. In Field v. Clark, for example, the Supreme Court stated, "That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." See Field v. Clark 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892). As recently as 1932, the Court observed, "That the legislative power of
Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear." See United States 7,. Shreveport Grain & Elevator
Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932). In both cases, the Court upheld the disputed delegations of congressional power.
96. Fisher, Delegating Power to thePresidet, 19 J. OF PUB. L. 251, 253 (1970).
97. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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Hampton v. United States (1928).98 In Buttfield, the Court upheld a broad congressional delegation in the area of foreign commerce, saying, "Congress
legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the
necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of
bringing about the result pointed out by the statute." 99
In Hampton, the Court went a step closer toward acknowledging the essentially legislative nature of" such delegations. Interestingly, the author of the
majority opinion was former President and then Chief Justice Taft, who
might have been expected to look with disfavor on broad delegations. Yet it
was Taft who drafted the well-known word formula of Hampton: "If Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative ac10
tion is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." 0
It is, of course, the ambiguity of this formulation that strikes one most. Is
Taft saying that, with the incorporation of an intelligible principle, the delegation ceases to be of legislative power? Or is he saying that, even with an intelligible principle, the delegation is essentially legislative, yet still acceptable?
Whatever Taft's precise meaning, the Hampton decision led to further rejection of the nineteenth century legal fictions. Most important were the famous New Deal cases, Panma Refining Co. v. R~van' " and Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. Uniited States.'0 2 In these cases, the Court actually overturned the congressional delegations in question, but seemed at last to concede that such delegations will inevitably be of legislative power. Having accepted this, it began to
set tentative guidelines for delegations. In particular, these cases establish
three principles: that delegation of powers must be to other public officials,
not to private groups; that Congress must clearly define the policy which it
wants implemented; and that Congress must provide standards to regulate
the actions of administrative officials.
Standards are the key. Subsequent delegation cases have been decided ac-

98.

Buttfield v. Stranahan. 192 U.S. 470 (1904); J. w. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,

276 U.S. 394 (1928).

99. 192 U.S. at 496.
100. 276 U.S. at 409. Some years later, in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1943),
the Court expanded on this point: "The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress
find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate. The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and
its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct ....

These essentials

are preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or
occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that

its statutory command shall be effective.101. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
102. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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cording to the presumed adequacy of the standards incorporated by Congress
in its statutes. The function of standards is clear: once delegations have been
accepted, standards are essential to preserving at least a semblance of account03
ability. In Arizona v. California (1963), Mr. Justice Harlan elaborated:1
The principle that authority granted by the legislature must be limited by
adequate standards serves two primary functions vital to preserving the separation of power required by the Constitution. First, it insures that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed
official but by the body immediately responsible to the people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at large by providing
the courts with some measure against which to judge the official action that
has been challenged.
Thus there are two avenues of attack on an executive order claiming direct authorization by Congress. The first is to demonstrate that the substance
of the order exceeds the terms of the authorization. The second is to challenge the authorization itself, to suggest that the statute contains inadequate
standards for guiding executive action. Neither attack is easily sustained. In
recent years, several executive measures have been struck down for exceeding
the statutory intent of Congress." 4 Since the New Deal, however, none of the
many statutes delegating congressional power to the executive has been overturned. In large part, this is because the established standards are quite
broad. Indeed, it seems that, given the nature of written law, it would be
difficult not to find a statement of policy and standards-an "intelligible
principle"-in all congressional statutes. This points to a further problem.
The courts have imposed only tentative guidelines; they have set no fixed,
clear limits on delegation at all.
In assessing executive orders, the key problem is to discern congressional
will. As Chief Justice Stone put it in

Yakus v. Unted States, ".

.

. the only

concern of courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed."'u 5 Even in cases of specific statutory authorization, this may be difficult. When Congress has not enacted a statute, it is, of course, even more
difficult. Cases of congressional inaction are not infrequent. As we shall see, it
is when Congress does not take initiative that Presidents may be most tempted
to legislate through executive orders. This creates a paradox: in cases where
Presidents are most likely to legislate by order, their authority to do so is least
clear.
The courts, however, have devised a means of resolving this paradox. Ingeniously enough, they have found, in congressional inaction, tacit support
for independent, unauthorized executive action. This approach-the "acquiescence doctrine"-dates back to United States v. Midwest Oil Company
103.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963).

104.

See note 81 supra.

105.

321 U.S. at 425.
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(1915).106 There, the Court was forced to rule on an executive order designed
to withdraw public lands from private acquisition, but promulgated without
specific authorization from Congress. Congress, it decided, has long known of
similar executive orders. Its continued silence could, therefore, be construed
as consent:
Government is a practical affair intended for practical men, and the rule that
long acquiescence in a governmental practice raises a presumption of authority applies to the practice of withdrawal by the Executive of lands opened by
Congress for occupation. While the Executive cannot by his course of action
create a power, a long continued practice to withdraw lands from occupation
after they have been opened by Congress, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, does raise a presumption that such power is exercised in pursuance
of the consent of Congress or of a recognized administrative power of the
Executive in the management of the public lands. 1117
This decision is perhaps most interesting for its implicit political theory. It
presumes on the side of presidential initiative. By requiring specific prohibitions against, rather than specific authorization for, executive action, Midwest
Oil moved the Court close to an acceptance of Theodore Roosevelt's steward8
ship theory. 10
There is a basic problem with the acquiescence doctrine, however. There
is simply no good reason to assume that congressional silence does, in fact,
imply consent. The Court in Midwest Oil assumed that inaction can be taken as
a sign of congressional support for executive orders. This seems questionable.
American democracy was not meant to be majoritarian; the organization of
Congress reflects that design. Congressional policy need not embody majority
sentiment. As Choper puts it:
If there is any single axiom that describes the Congress, it is that neither the
method for selection of its members nor its actual modes of behavior result in
the automatic translation of the majority will into detailed legislation ....
The
result is the possibility, indeed not infrequentlv the actuality, of minority con09
trol over the making of government policy.1
Choper is worried primarily about the inability of Congress to express the
majority of the public's opinion accurately. It is no less true, however, that the
structure of Congress may prevent it from expressing the majority of Congress' opinion directly. In particular, the existence of bicameralism, filibuster
(ended only by a two-thirds vote for cloture), and a strict division of
policymaking labor characterized by deference to committees and, especially,
to committee chairmen, provides minorities with ample opportunity to obstruct legislation they oppose. Thus, in any specific instance, the mere fact of
106.

107.
108.

United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).

Id. at 472, 474.
See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
109. Choper, The Supreme Court atil the Political Branches: Democratic Theory mid Practice, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 810, 817 (1974).
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congressional "failure" to pass a proposed bill need not imply majority opposition to that bill. At the least, any attempt to assess the "will" or position of
Congress must probe more deeply to look at forces that may have sidetracked
a proposal, or perhaps even to suggest ones that may account for its not being
raised in the first place.
Furthermore, to speak of congressional "silence," or "acquiescence," or
"will" is to deal in abstractions. The Midwest Oil decision, as well as more recent sweeping criticisms of congressional "inertia" tend to reify the concept of
Congress, and thus to impede our understanding of its internal politics.
Again, silence need not imply some sort of unanimous, or even majority, tacit
consent. Instead, it may reflect deep divisions between powerful interests. It is
not at all clear that, in such cases, either the courts, or critics, should presume
in favor of presidential action. Choper notes, with some dismay, the "negativism" of congressional policymaking. He quotes an observation that "a distinguishing feature of our system . . . is that our governmental structure, institutional habits, and political parties . . . have combined to produce a system

in which major programs and major new directions cannot be undertaken unless supported by a fairly broad popular consensus. This normally has been
far broader than 51 per cent, and often bi-partisan as well." 110 Curiously,
Choper seems not even to consider the possibility that this may be a benefit,
rather than a cost. It is at least arguable that it is precisely the boldest innovations that require the most deliberate debate and analysis. In most cases, to
approve of a broad presidential prerogative may serve only to risk a calamitous policy and to undermine democratic decision procedures.
Of course, one need not concede that congressional slowness is typically
beneficial. Yet, even then, it need not follow that the President should enjoy
legislative prerogative. In that case, the problem is to weigh the presumed
social benefits of the desired policy against the possible costs of evading Congress and undermining democratic norms."'
This analysis suggests that the acquiescence doctrine fails to resolve this
paradox of presidential legislation. It succeeds primarily in legitimating presidential law-making when it is least desirable. Congressional inaction may reflect a period of policy "incubation," '1 2 in which new ideas are being considered and consensus is being built. For example, Congress has often been
criticized for its failure to intercede earlier and end American involvement in
Viet Nam. Yet such criticisms typically overlook the deep divisions within
Congress, and the country as a whole, which prevented such action.
Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's changing events and membership
110.

Id. at 830-831 (quoting R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
10(1968)).
This is the approach taken by Mr. Justice Douglas in Youngstoz,'.
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111.
See 343 U.S. at 633
(Douglas. J., concturring).
112. Polsbv. Stoeigthenitig Copigi ess in Aa/ioal Policy -1akimg, 59 YALE L. REV. 481. 489 (1970).

Page 1: Summer 1976]

PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION

were altering the components of congressional will. Sweeping attacks on congressional "inertia" may miss this reality of politics. Similarly, until 1964, divisions within Congress prevented the passage of substantial legislation on civil
rights. A series of Presidents, however, felt compelled to take innovative action in this area, and as the next section will show, the courts uniformly supported their moves.
Executive orders are clearly important for American politics and policy,
and have frequently been considered by the courts. Yet the bases by which
they may be authorized have rarely been analyzed closely. Mr. Justice
113
It
Jackson's formulation in Youngstown remains the most definitive account.
was the purpose of this section to elaborate Jackson's analysis somewhat-to
develop a framework with which to assess the constitutionality of such orders.
It remains to apply that framework to specific cases.
E.

Executive Orders and Usurpation: The Case of Civil Rights

Not until 1964 did Congress enunciate a national policy on civil rights. In
the thirty years before that, policy in the field was made by the President and
Supreme Court. The standard presidential policymaking tool was the executive order. Initiatives were first taken by Roosevelt and Truman to desegregate the military services. Their orders initially concerned military personnel
in times of declared war and national emergency.' 14 These initiatives were
then extended to affect civilian groups in peacetime. These included orders
calling for, first, nondiscrimination,' 15 then, affirmative action, in employment
by government contractors,' 1 6 and later, nondiscrimination in filling govern17
ment funded housing."
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is significant for the analysis
of the executive orders in this field. Before 1964, orders concerning civil
rights were promulgated without specific congressional authorization. In considering the validity of such orders, the task is to determine, first, whether
Presidents possessed sufficient constitutional authorization for their actions,
and second, whether any related statutes, or even congressional inaction, can
be construed as providing direct or implied authorization of executive action.
For orders issued after 1964, the task is to determine whether Presidents exceeded the statutory guidelines set out in 1964. Brief analysis of a pre-196 4
executive order will reveal some of the constitutional and political problems
associated with them.
On March 6, 1961, John Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10925. This

113.

See 343 U.S. at 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring).

114.
115.

See notes 42-43 supra.
Exec. Order No. 10,590, 3 C.F.R. 237 (1954-1958 Compilation).

116.
117.

See note 45 supia.
See note 44 supra.
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order replaced the Committee on Government Employment Policy and the
Government Contract Committee with a Presidential Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity. The purpose of the order, and its Committee, was
to enforce a policy of nondiscrimination in both government employment and
private employment conducted under government contract. The order went
beyond previous orders of nondiscrimination. It gave the Committee broad
powers to investigate the employment practices of contractors, and to punish
them if they failed to comply with employment regulations. It required, for
the first time, that both government contractors and agencies go beyond mere
nondiscrimination in hiring. It ordered them to take "affirmative action" to
equalize employment opportunities for minorities. 18
The President's decision to rely on an executive order rather than congressional legislation is readily explained. For him, civil rights was essentially
a moral issue; yet, it was just as clearly a political problem. During the 1960
election campaign, he had sought to cement the New Deal Democratic coalition with a pledge of leadership in civil rights. After his inauguration, however, he failed to include civil rights recommendations in his legislative program. His reasons were clear: he feared a loss of support from Southern
Democrats for policy proposals which held a higher priority in the White
House. At a press conference in March 1961, he described the problem.
There were, Kennedy contended, a "good deal of things we can do now in
administering laws previously passed by the Congress, particularly in the area
of voting, and also by using the powers which the Constitution gives to the
President through executive orders." He added, "When I feel that there is a
necessity for a congressional action, with a chance of getting that congressional action, then I will recommend it to Congress."' 1 9 Thus, in acting
through an executive order, the President was honoring a campaign pledge
which he could not expect Congress to heed. In fact, it was not until June
1963, that Kennedy, at last, submitted civil rights proposals to Congress. This
was in response to confrontations over the admission of blacks to the University of Alabama. He sensed, apparently, that Congress could not, in such a
crisis, avoid taking action. As he put it, "The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them."' 20
Under closer to normal conditions, however, Congress could not be expected to act. Executive Order No. 10925 provided the desired policy despite a
reluctant Congress. An analysis of its validity is complicated by one factor:
The Executive was quite vague in specifying its presumed bases of authoriza-

118. See R. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 46-47.
119. The President's News Conference of March 8, 1961, 1961 PUB. PAPERS. 152, 156-57.
120. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, June 19, 1963,
1963 PUB. PAPFRS. 483, 483.
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tion. It appealed only to the "Constitution" and "statutes" of the United
States. As a result, the courts, when considering this order, were forced to
infer specific sources of authorization.
The order's reference simply to the "Constitution" suggests a broad interpretation of executive powers. Since there is not even a hint of national
emergency in the terms of the order, the Commander-in-Chief clause does
not seem to apply. Nor, of course, does the President's inherent power in
foreign affairs. This leaves the "executive power" and "take care" clauses as
possible bases for issuing the order.
Discerning sources of statutory authority for the order is even more difficult. Since the order appeals to "statutes," albeit vaguely, direct authorization
must be found. The courts considered Executive Order No. 10925 twice, in
Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Compai'y (1964), l"2 and in Farkas v. Texas Istrumiiit, Inc. (1967).1l 2 In both cases, they upheld the order, finding adequate

statutory authorization for it in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.113 There, Congress stated its policy: "It is the intent of the
Congress in enacting this legislation to provide for the Government an
economical and efficient system for the (a) procurement and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services, including related functions such as
"124 To this end, it delegated powers to the President: "The
contracting
President may prescribe such policies and directives, not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to effectuate the provisions
of said Act, which policies and directives shall govern the administrator and
executive agencies in carrying out their respective functions hereunder." 125
From this, the courts in Farmer and Farkas concluded that the President had
adequate authority to establish regulations governing the hiring practices of
government contractors.
There are several problems with this ruling. First, a closer look at the 1949
Act indicates that its policy aims are quite different from those of the executive order. The 1949 Act was designed specifically to rationalize property
management by the federal government, that is, to "simplify the procure,,126 Executive
ment, utilization, and disposal of government property.
Order No. 10925, in contrast, was concerned only incidentally with the procurement and management of property and services. Its essential aim was to
promote social equality, a worthy enough goal, but not one contemplated by
the 1949 Act. The language which the Court of Appeals used in its decision
in Farkas seems to reveal its own ambivalence on this point:
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
63 Stat. 377 (1949) (codified in scattered sections of 40, 41, 44, 50 app. U.S.C.).
40 U.S.C. § 471 (1970).
40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1970).
63 Stat. 377 (1949).
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We would be hesitant to say that the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive Order No. 10925 are so unrelated to the establishment of "an economical
and efficient system for . . . the procurement and supply of property and
services," 40 U.S.C.A. 471, that the order should be treated as issued without
statutory authority . . . . We, therefore, conclude that Executive Order No.
10925 was
issued pursuant to statutory authority, and has the force and effect
27
of law.
Thus the court seems to be conceding that the Order is, in fact, unrelated
to the aims of the 1949 Act, but apparently not so unrelated as to have denied authority to the executive order. Unfortunately, the court did not suggest how unrelated an order would have to be before it could be said to have
violated the intent of the 1949 Act.
Second, the 1949 Act sought to simplify government procedure; it empowered the President to prescribe only such measures as would establish an
"economical and efficient" system for procuring property and services. Yet, it
is arguable that affirmative action only complicates the procurement of
services-that it is uneconomical and, for that reason, inefficient. 12 8 Affirmative action, after all, imposes search costs on the contractor. He must advertise
the project and interview minority personnel. He may then be forced to provide special training. One can reasonably expect these increased costs to be
passed on to the government in the form of higher bids by the contractors. If
this argument is correct, it suggests that the policy embodied in Executive
Order No. 10925 is actually inconsistent with the provisions of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act. In that case, the order could not
properly be said to have direct congressional authorization.
Third, on several occasions, Congress had been forced to respond to earlier executive initiatives in civil rights. Its judgment had consistently been negative. In 1951, for example, it had expressly refused to continue the Fair Employment Practices Committee, which had been created in 1941 by Franklin
Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 8802. Some years later, Congress refused to
provide support for the Committee on Government Contracts, which had
been created in 1953 by Executive Order No. 10479. In the three years between the promulgation of Executive Order No. 10925 and the decision in the
Farmer case, Congress continued to deny support for the presidential initiative. In Farmer, the court conceded these points. It observed:
• . . Congress has not directly appropriated any money for carrying out the
policies announced in the executive order. A report by the Committee on
Government Contracts notes that attempts to secure some form of congressional sanction for the program failed in the 1958-59 session and were defeated at both the regular and special session in 1960.29
127. 375 F.2d at 632, n.I.
128. In reply, it could be argued that the short-term costs of the program might yield greater
long-term benefits by reducing unemployment and economic unrest among minority groups.
129. 329 F.2d at 8, n.9.
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Thus the response of Congress to executive actions in civil rights, from 1950
to 1964, can hardly be characterized as one of "acquiescence" or tacit consent.
Accordingly, it would be difficult indeed to discern some form of implicit
congressional authorization for Executive Order No. 10925.
The remaining question is whether the President possessed sufficient constitutional authority to act independently of Congress. President Kennedy apparently believed that the "executive power" and "take care" clauses conferred
upon him adequate authority to issue the order. Indeed, it is arguable that his
responsibility under the "take care" clause to implement the spirit of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments obliged him to act. Unfortunately, this issue was
neither raised before nor addressed by the courts in either Farmer or Farkas.
In the end, the courts based their support of the executive order on a
finding of adequate statutory authority. This analysis has suggested that these
courts were ingenious, but possibly incorrect, in their finding. As we have
seen, the statute which was supposed to have provided the necessary authority
was originally intended for quite different purposes. Moreover, the executive
order may actually have violated the expressed will of Congress in two ways.
First, it could, with some justification, be said to have violated the standard of
"economical and efficient" procurement of services set by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. Second, it appears to have violated the
negative opinion on civil rights which Congress had made manifest in the
t30
years immediately preceding the executive order.
This point is perhaps most important. The essential task of the courts,
after all, is to determine if the will of Congress has been obeyed. In
Youmigstown, for example, the Supreme Court had relied heavily on its observation that, when Congress had debated the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it had
explicitly refused to give Presidents the power to seize factories."' 1 Similarly,
Congress had expressly refused to support the presidential policy on civil
rights. These actions represent a more direct congressional commentary on
civil rights than the provisions of the 1949 Act on property procurement.
Accordingly, there is some reason to question the validity of the statutory
authorization found by the courts for Executive Order 10925.
This executive order was promulgated in the famous "zone of twilight"
described by Jackson in YouugStowvo.

1 a2

Congress and the President clearly

have concurrent authority to make policy in the area of fair employment. Yet,
since the President expected to be denied the concurrence required for law,
130. One commentator wrote: "Congress has expressly refused to continue the FEPC [Fair
Employment Practices Commission] and has declined to enact antidiscriminatory legislation. For
the executive to attempt to reach the same result by indirection, through the Government contract device, is an unconstitutional attempt to legislate where Congress has refused to do so. See
Pasley, The Nondiscrimintion Clause n Governnent Co ntracts, 43 VIRG,INIA L. REv. 857 (1957).
131. See 343 U.S. at 586.
132. 1d. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.,concurring).

[Vol. 40: No. 3

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

he attempted to legislate unilaterally through an executive order. Morgan describes the circumstances: "While there was insufficient support for fair employment legislation to overcome inertia and the procedural obstacles in both
houses of Congress, there was also insufficient congressional opposition to
1 33
discourage the President from acting."'
Thus it is in this "zone of twilight" that Presidents will be most tempted to
make policy through an executive order. As Jackson observed,

"...

congres-

sional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility."1 34 Yet, it is also in such circumstances that presidential authority to
make law is least clear.
In this case of Executive Order No. 10925, in particular, President Kennedy may actually have gone farther, by defying the will of Congress expressed
in 1957, 1959, and 1960.1 35 Accordingly, his authority would seem weaker
still. As Jackson continued: "When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."136 With this executive order,
there was no question of the right of Congress to act as it did. As a result,
Kennedy's power to issue the order would seem to have been "at its lowest
ebb"-so low, in fact, that to sustain the order, the courts were forced to find
a basis of authorization in a largely unrelated statute.
This analysis of Executive Order No. 10925 illuminates some of the problems of presidential legislation. First, it suggests the power of the executive order as a policymaking tool. It provides Presidents with great latitude to achieve
their political goals despite a divided or reluctant Congress. Second, it reveals
one of the basic tensions of the American constitutional system-a tension
often confronted by the courts. That is between the requirement of adherence to constitutionally mandated procedures for legislative decisionmaking
and the demand for prompt, efficient achievement of desired public goals.
The hopes of the nation often rest with the President; it is the task of Congress to realize those hopes. Yet, as Mr. Justice Douglas noted, "Legislative
action may . . . often

be cumbersome,

time-consuming,

and apparently

inefficient."' 37 The result is often deadlock, with presidential legislation seeming to provide an attractive solution. That apparent inefficiency of the legislative process, however, is simply a "price" which "we pay ... for our system of
checks and balances, for the distribution of powers among the three branches

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

R. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 58.

343 U.S. at 637.
See notes 129-130 supa.
343 U.S. at 637.
Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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of government."' 3 8 In return, we gain some assurance that different positions
will be heard, that conflicting interests will be reconciled into coalitions, that a
consensus will be formed. Most importantly, we gain some protection against
arbitrary executive action. When the courts are too eager to provide justification for presidential policymaking, they both undermine these constitutional
norms and encourage continued, and possible excessive, executive action.
In the field of civil rights, presidential action came perilously close to
usurping the legislative prerogatives of Congress. When these initiatives were
challenged, they found support in the courts. Often, however, Congress itself
encourages far-reaching presidential policymaking by delegating legislative
power to the President and his subordinates. On occasion, such delegations
have seemed almost to represent an abdication of congressional power and
responsibility.
F. Executive Orders and Abdication:
The Case of Economic Stabilization
Since the New Deal, regulation of the economy has become a basic task for
the federal government. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was
the first major attempt to control aspects of the national economy.' 3 9 This was
followed by extensive programs of wage and price controls during both
World War 1114 and the Korean War.1 4 1 Most recently, from 1971 to 1974,
the Nixon Administration conducted an even more elaborate, four phase
program of economic controls, an effort unprecedented in peacetime.
Each of these programs was made possible by congressional action-in
particular, by broad delegations of policymaking authority to the President or
other executive branch administrators. Three of these delegations were challenged in the courts. The delegation involved in the NIRA was overturned by
the Supreme Court in the Schechter case. The Emergency Price Control Act of
1942142 and the Economic Stabilization Act of 197014 3 were both upheld. The
issue, in each case, was essentially the same: did Congress impose clear limits
on the power it delegated? Did it provide standards adequate to guide executive branch action, to prevent arbitrary presidential decisions, and to hold
both Congress and the President accountable before the public and courts?
.A brief look at the most recent such delegation-the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970-is useful for the study of executive orders. The legislative
history of the Act suggests some of the reasons for Congress' tendency to
delegate broadly. An analysis of the court challenge to this delegation pro138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

/d. at 633.
48 Stat. 195 (1933-34).
See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
See Tiile IV, Defense ProdUction Aci of 1950, 64 Stat. 798 (1950).
Yaktus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
Amalgamated Meal C tiets v. Connally, 337 F. Stip. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
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vides further evidence of the means which the courts have found to sustain
the policies effected by Presidents through executive orders.
Beginning in the late 1960's, the American economy entered a period of
severe inflation, as high consumer demand combined with the pressures of
the Viet Nam war to push prices rapidly upward. 1 44 Calls for some form of
wage and price controls were quickly heard, but were ignored by the Executive. The arrival, in 1969, of a Republican President provided the opportunity
for fresh approaches to cure these economic ills. But this opportunity was not
taken. In fact, in a radio address of June 1970, President Nixon emphatically
ruled out a wage and price freeze, arguing: "I will not take this nation down
the road of wage-and-price controls, however politically expedient they may
seem. They only postpone a day of reckoning, and in so doing they rob every
American of an important part of his freedom". 145
Nevertheless, demands for more decisive measures continued, and began
to take root in Congress. In March 1970, the Joint Economic Committee
called for more active presidential restraint of wage and price increases. In
May, the Chairman of the House Banking Committee, Wright Patman, wrote
to the President, offering "to give you any tools which you feel are needed to
bring the current economic situation under control."' 46 In August, legislative
steps were taken. In a measure remarkable for its delegating power both so
broadly and with so few words, Congress gave the President authority to initiate wage and price controls. The sections of the Economic Stabilization Act
which accomplish the delegation are as follows:
Section 202. Presidential Authority-(a). The President is authorized to issue
such orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices,
rents, wages, and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25,
1970. Such orders and regulations may provide for the making of such adjustments as may be necessary to prevent gross inequities.
Section 203. Delegation-The President may delegate the performance of
any function tinder this title to such officers, departments, and agencies of
the United States as he may deem appropriate.
Some months later, Section 202 of the Act was amended to include an addi-

tional stricture:
(b). The authority conferred on the President by this section shall not be ex-

ercised with respect to a particular industry or segment of the economy unless
the President, after taking into account the seasonal nature of the employment, the rate of employment or underemployment, and other mitigating factors, determines that prices or wages in that industry or segment of the
economy have increased at a rate which is grossly disproportionate to the rate
at which prices or wages have increased in the economy generally.'14
144.
145.
146.
147.

This account is taken largely from L. SALAMON, THE
Id. at313.
Id.at 315.
note 4,at453-454.
Comment. suplra

MONEY5 COMMITTEES

311-390 (1975).
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The ostensible aim of the Act was to give the President those policymaking
tools which Wright Patman had offered him in May. But Nixon had already
indicated his dislike for such tools. Moreover, the law only authorized him to
act, it did not require anything of him. Thus there was surely another motivation for the Act. As one commentator explains it:
The idea, in short, was to put the President on the spot, to place squarely on
his shoulders the politically unpopular chore of imposing wage and price conof the
trols while relieving the Democrats of any responsibility for the state
148
economy in anticipation of the upcoming November 1970 elections.
Whatever the reasons behind the bill, the dangers of the measure were
readily apparent. The President's own Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Arthur Burns, argued before a congressional committee, "You are giving too
much power to the President under this legislation. You are giving the President virtually dictatorial power."' 49 Senator William Proxmire complained
that the law gave the President "unprecedented power to control wages and
prices with virtually no congressional standards or criteria on how the author50
ity should be used and no legal safeguards for affected parties."'
For almost a year, the President refused to exercise the power granted
him. In the meantime, Congress amended and extended the Act.' 1' Finally,
on August 15, 1971, the President surprised the country and Congress by
taking action. He declared a ninety-day freeze on all non-agricultural wages
and prices and created a Cost of Living Council to administer the program.'
On October 15, 1971, through another executive order, he created additional
administrative machinery to implement the stabilization program.

15

3

This "New Economic Policy" was quickly challenged in the courts. A national trade union, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, realized that the freeze
would prevent inplementation of a wage increase which it had won for its
members through collective bargaining in 1970. Accordingly, it brought suit
before a three judge District Court to have the original Economic Stabilization
154
Act and Executive Order No. 11615, which was issued under it, overturned.
The Act, the union argued, was unconstitutional because it vested "unbridled
legislative power in the President"; it was a "naked grant of authority" to
determine whether wages and prices "will be controlled, and the scope, manner and timing of those controls."' 1 55 The "net result" of the delegation, it

supra note 141, at 316.

148.

SALAMON,

149.

Id. at 322.

150.
151.

Id. at 327.
See note 147 supra.

152.

See note 51 supra.

153. Id.
154. See note 143 supra. (This was the only court to address the constitutionality of the
Economic Stabilization Act).
155. 337 F. Supp. at 745.
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contended, was "a legislative initiation of control by bare executive fiat, with
156
completely unlimited authority put at the disposal of the President."
Writing the opinion of the court, Judge Harold Leventhal rejected the
claims of the union. The union's charge, he conceded, was "a formidable
fusillade, devastating verbally and not without force analytically. 1' 5

7

In this

congressional act, he admitted, "The Rule of Law [had] been beleaguered."
But, he insisted, it had not been "breached."'1 5 As Leventhal noted, the Constitution does not forbid every delegation of legislative power. "The problem,"
rather, "is one of limits.'

1 59

More precisely, he argued, borrowing language

from Yakus, "The issue is whether the legislative description of the task assigned 'sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so
that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will.' "160 "Under these governing concepts," the court concluded,
"we cannot say that there is such an absence of standards that it would be
impossible to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed."' 61
The standards which the court found were both explicit and implicit in
the Act. The explicit standards were found in Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of
the law: the President could not stabilize wages and prices at any level lower
than that prevailing on May 25, 1970; he was allowed to make "such adjustments as may be necessary to prevent gross inequities"; he was not to single
out any industry or sector of the economy, unless he found that price or wage
increases in that industry or sector of the economy were "grossly disproportionate" with those in the economy as a whole.' 62 Implicit standards could be
deduced from several sources, including the legislative history of the 1970
Act, and the legislative and judicial experience with the 1942 and 1950 programs. Finally, several other limits on executive action could be found. First,
the statute itself was self-terminating. Unless Congress chose to extend the
Act, the President's authority would automatically end on April 30, 1972.163
Second, the court found "implicit in the Act" a "requirement that any action
taken by the Executive under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must be in
accordance with further standards developed by the Executive."' 164 To be
sure, the court admitted, "This 1970 Act gives broadest latitude to the Executive." Yet, it also implies "an on-going requirement of intelligible administrative policy that is corollary to and implementing of the legislature's ultimate

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 747.
See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
337 F. Supp. at 754.
Id. at 758.

Page 1: Summer 1976]

PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION

standard and objective." ' 65 Finally, the decisions of the administrative agencies
created by the executive order would be subject to judicial review under the
66
Administrative Procedure Act.1
Several points can be made about this court's decision. First, the court may
have overstated the extent to which the Act "marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act .
1.67 The initial standard involves the level of stabilization. Prices cannot be set lower than their level of May 25, 1970. But it is
important to recall that the law was not passed until August 1970, and that
the President did not act under it until a year later-almost fifteen months
after the date of the May 25, 1970 price floor. In that time, prices had risen
by approximately six per cent. The President could hardly be expected to roll
back wages and prices. In short, the price floor stated in the Act, long since
surpassed by the reality of inflation, provided very little guidance to the President. The President, moreover, was granted complete freedom over the timing of controls and the ceiling levels he could impose.
The other explicit standards seem only slightly more restrictive. For example, in Section 202(a), the President is not required to prevent "gross inequities"; he is simply allowed to do so if he so chooses. As the Act puts it, his
regulations "max provide" for the prevention of gross inequities. Moreover,
Congress offered no definition of the term, "gross inequities"; the President,
apparently, is to determine its meaning. Similarly, the court stressed the requirement in Section 202(b) that the President not single out any industry or
sector of the economy for controls. But this clause also contains the broad
loophole that the President may single out an industry if he determines that
its rate of increase in prices or wages has been "grossly disproportionate" to
that in the economy as a whole. Again, the definition of "grossly dispropor68
tionate" is left entirely to the President.1
In the end, the court seems to have been most influenced, not by these
explicit standards, but by other factors from which it could infer an exercise
of legislative will and construct a set of implicit standards. From a reading of
the legislative history, for example, it concluded that Congress had deliberated this measure fully, and decided simply that maximum flexibility was
needed for an effective attack on inflation. Thus, the court stated, "We cannot say that this delegation was unreasoned, or a mere abdication to the Pres-

165. Id. at 759.
166. Id. at 759-60.
167. See note 160 supra.
168. These key terms of the Act-"inequities" and "disproportionate"-are open to a variety
of reasonable definitions. Mr. Justice Roberts noted this problem in his dissent in Yakus. There,
speaking of similar words in the Emergency Price Control Act, he commented: "It hardly need be
said that men may differ radically as to the connotation of these terms and that it would be very
difficult to convict anyone of error in judgment in so classifying a given economic phenomenon."
321 U.S. at 449-50.
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ident to do whatever he willed." 1 6 9 It should be noted, however, that in interpreting the legislative history of the Act in this manner, the court chose to
ignore the bluntly political motives which other commentators had imputed to
Congress.
Further, the court seemed to stress the self-terminating nature of the statute, according to which, no matter what the President had or had not -done
under the authority of the Act, Congress would be obliged to "undertake an
affirmative review without prolonged delay, without the option of acquiescence by inaction.'170 Similarly, decisions of the executive could be appealed
under the Administrative Procedure Act. It is important to note, however,
that these two factors represent, not standards which guide the President
while he is making a decision, but avenues of recourse to be pursued after he
has made and implemented his decision.
Most interesting is the court's construction of implicit standards. The 1942
Act had included a provision that stabilization decisions be "generally fair and
equitable." The court, in 1971, concluded that such a "broad equity standard
171
is inherent in a stabilization program" and thus implicit in the 1970 Act.
Similarly, the 1942 Act required that the Executive accompany all regulations
with a "statement of considerations" used in determining them. In 1971, the
court again seemed to assume that this requirement was implicit in the 1970
Act, and would help "limit the latitude of subsequent executive action." 172
Having found these standards, however, the court .then seemed to reverse
itself by arguing that the President need not be limited by them. There were,
it observed, "significant differences between the inflationary problems of 1970
and the inflationary problems of 1942 and 1950" which provided "additional
reasons for differences in policies."' 73 Thus: "We do not suggest that the
1970 law was intended as or constitutes a duplicate of the earlier laws . ...
The approaches and decisions under the earlier laws are certainly not frozen
as guidelines for the present law."' 74 In short, the 1942 and 1950 statutes are
said to provide standards for the 1970 program. Nevertheless, action taken
under the 1970 Act is not to be limited by these earlier statutes. The court
75
never indicates how it proposes to resolve this tension.'
This analysis suggests some of the court's intentions. The court seemed
impressed by the gravity of the country's economic situation, and thus was
inclined to approve decisive executive action. As it remarked, "The present

169.

337 F. Supp. at 751.
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administration is entitled to a fresh approach." 176 To sustain the congressional
delegation and the executive order issued under it, it sought only the
minimum exercise of congressional will, some indication that Congress had
deliberated the Act carefully-some assurance that the "whole program" had
not been "set adrift without any rudder.' ' 77 From the history of the legislation and the record of previous statutes, the court found the sense of congressional direction it sought, the barest fragments of a guiding "rudder." By
so doing, it maintained the modern tradition of upholding broad delegations
of congressional power.
II
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Presidential legislation is a political, as well as a constitutional, problem. Its
uses are shaped by the existing power relations among the President, Congress, and the courts. Its implementation, in turn, shapes the nature of those
relations. In this section, we want only to make a few points concerning the
political dimension of executive orders. In particular, we shall look briefly at
the role of Congress in national policymaking, at the impact of executive orders on the evolution of presidential power, and at the implications of executive orders for democratic theory.
A.

Congress and National Policymaking

Political scientists have long attacked legislatures. For Bagehot

178

and

Mill, 1 79 legislatures were essential to democracy in large countries. Yet, both

writers questioned the ability of representative assemblies to make law effectively. As early as 1921, Bryce was able to observe a "decline"-indeed, a
"pathology"-of legislatures. "The dignity and moral influence of representa80
tive legislatures," he noted, "have been declining."'1
In the 1950's and early 196 0's, this assessment became conventional wisdom. American political scientists were especially critical of Congress. With
the institutionalization of the Presidency, the growth of the executive establishment, and the rise of presidential initiative in legislation and budgeting,
the law-making role of Congress had, in the opinion of many, all but evaporated. This trend, however, was not cause for alarm. In fact, it was probably
beneficial, since the Presidency was somehow more representative, and the
executive branch bureaucracy more expert in policymaking than Congress.
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229-235
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337 F. Supp. at 748.
Id. at 749.
See W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAYS 203-204,
(1920).
See J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 141-51 (1948).
2 J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES, 345, 356 (1921).
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The proper role for Congress, then, was limited. 81 It was to perform constituency functions: acting as an ombudsman on citizen complaints; "mobilizing
consent" among the public for presidential policy initiatives.I"'
As a description of political "reality," this assessment has always been
greatly exaggerated. Writers from Huitt,1 83 Polsby, 18 4 and Wildavsky1 85 to
Price,1 86 Orfield, 18 7 and Cronin' 88 have all provided a more balanced account
of the impact of Congress on national policy, especially domestic policy.
Moreover, with an ideological change in the White House-that is, Republican
Presidencies from 1969 to 1977-the image of Congress as the "negative"
force in federal government had to be revised. As a normative theory, this
image of Congress contradicts the basic principles of American democracy.
There can be little doubt that the constitutional Framers intended Congress to
be the primary source of legislative initiative.18 9 Furthermore, arguments for
the greater representativeness of the Presidency are hardly persuasive.
Watergate-era revelations about special interest influence in the executive
branch have shattered, perhaps irrevocably, any notions that the Presidency
necessarily represents "all of the people."
Yet the critique of Congress is powerful in one major respect. Our analysis
must distinguish between taking initiative in policy, and drafting that policy
thoughtfully. Congress has amply demonstrated its willingness to initiate policy, especially in emergencies. It has been less successful, however, in formulating policy in a detailed fashion. (The tax laws, of course, are a striking
exception). In particular, Congress has tended to rid itself of difficult policy
concerns, such as economic stabilization, by delegating power to the President.
Thus a paradox: the most decisive exercises of congressional legislative power
often consist in broad delegations of that power to the President.
The problem, then, is to resolve this paradox, to explain why Congress has
been inclined (some might say, eager) to delegate its power so broadly. In
fact, there are two distinct questions to be considered. First, why must Congress delegate at all? Second, why has it delegated so much power, so often?
Answers to the first question are familiar enough. Congress, it is agreed,
simply cannot administer the laws itself. Historically, Congress met only infre-

See Huntington, supra note 32.
See Beer, The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent, in LAWMAKERS IN A
CHANGING WORLD 30 (E. Frank ed. 1966).
183. See Huitt, Congress, The Durable Partner, in LAWMAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 9 (E.

181.
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Frank ed. 1966).
184. See N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY (1964).
185. See Wildavsky, The Two Presidents, in THE PRESIDENT 230 (A. Wildavsky ed. 1969).
186. See D. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE LAWS? (1972).
187. See G. ORFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL POWER: CONGRESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1975).
188. See T. CRONIN, THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY 85-116 (1975).
189. See De Grazia, Toward a New Model of Congress, in CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH
GOVERNMENT 12 (A. De Grazia ed. 1967).
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quently. Delegation was needed to ensure the continuity of administration.
Today delegation is just as necessary:
Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that
the exertion of legislative power does not become futility .... [The] burdens

of minutiae would be apt to clog the administration of the law and deprive
the agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are its salient virtues. 190
Congress cannot anticipate all future needs. Therefore it must word its
statutes broadly, and grant administrators discretion over the timing of implementation. As society, social needs, and the law have all become more
complex, it has been argued, the need for flexibility has increased. Thus the

Supreme Court has observed:
In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its
functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy in fixing, for example, a
tariff rate, a railroad rate, or the rate of wages to be applied in particular
industries by a minimum wage law. The Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding
the impossible or the impracticable.19
The problem with these arguments is that they can neither explain nor
justify the extreme grants of administrative discretion which have characterized Congress. The argument about complexity, in particular, cuts both
ways. It may be that complexity requires flexibility. Yet it seems just as true
that complexity, and increased governmental attempts to cope with it, require
careful thought and clear guidelines. Thus there is surely force to Lowi's observation that: "As public control extended to wider and more novel realms,
delegation became a virtue rather than a problem. The question of standards
disappeared as the need for them increased."192

An understanding of Congress' inclination to delegate broadly requires a
closer look at the politics of congressional policymaking. Put simply, indi-

vidual Congressmen seem to lack incentives sufficient to prompt them to
draft proposals carefully and limit delegations. In a country where public
awareness of Congress is both limited and intermittent, Congressmen are
rarely the object of close public scrutiny. 193 In crises, where public attention
and demands are forced on Congress, that institution can be expected to act.
But even then, as Mayhew has noted, the political payoff for the individual
Congressman lies in taking the "right position," rather than in laboring to
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draft policy coherently, or even in seeing his side win. 1 94 The public, apparently, has little interest in the nuances of power relations between President
and Congress. Its desire, especially in crises, is for action. Edelman has argued that the public's demand is for an assurance that something is being
done, and assurance which need only be symbolic, not substantive. 195 The
simplest response for Congress, then, is to create a highly visible executive
agency, and to endow it with a broad mandate. For Congressmen, the development of strict guidelines and maintenance of oversight after performing
the delegation are less rewarding, politically, than simply producing the
symbol.
Other factors may also be involved. One is the pressure to forage coalitions out of a divided Congress. Legislators can agree on a policy for different
reasons. To force them to make those reasons explicit, to specify their intentions, by embodying them in detailed legislation, may only undermine the
agreement on that proposal. A second factor may be lack of expertise and
time among Congressmen and their staffs. When faced with vocal public demands and limited time, Congressmen may be satisfied with any legislation
rather than carefully drawn legislation. Third, and perhaps most important, is
the relationship between Congress and interest groups. Congress faces a large
number of demands, which are earnestly expressed by well organized groups.
For almost every demand, there will be organized opposition: action is bound
to offend someone. Yet, action cannot be avoided. Vague legislation is a standard congressional response. As Judge Henry Friendly explains it:
[In the face of interest group pressure] the optimum is to do nothing, since
failure will be understood by those desiring the legislation whereas success will
not be forgiven by those opposing [it]. If legislation there must be, the very
necessity of a text arouses further opposition; hence the196tendency to soften it
in the sense of compromise and even of unintelligibility.
Delegation is another standard response. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter describe
it, "If the demands exceed what the Congressman can effectively handle, then
he may happily yield up a significant portion of his power."1 97 A member of
Congress, Senator Robert Packwood, is even more succinct, "We can delegate
powers to the President, then sit back and carp or applaud, depending on
whether what he does is popular or unpopular.' 98
Delegation, then, has proved most useful for the Congress. It enables
Congressmen to cope with pointed political demands. It makes the President
194.
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responsible for potentially unpleasant policy measures. But to explain the
emergence of a practice or institution is not necessarily to justify it. Simply to
account for a practice is not to say that it is either necessary or acceptable.
Explanation implies justification only if we make one of the three following
assumptions: first, that the practice is inevitable and not subject to change (a
conclusion that typically results from particular assumptions about human
nature); second, that the benefits of the practice exceed its costs; or third,
that the cost of altering or ending the practice would exceed the benefits of
doing so.
Can the practice of broad congressional delegations be justified, and accepted, according to these criteria? We think not. First, there is nothing
"natural" or inevitable about broad delegations. Delegations were not always
as consistently broad as they have become. Arguments have been made to
suggest a sort of technological imperative behind broad delegations. That is,
delegation is said to be required by the complexity of existing social problems.
Yet, as we have already argued, these claims are not persuasive. Complexity is
as much a reason for precise standards and limited exercise of presidential
power as it is for broad delegations. What has changed, however, is the popular ideology concerning delegations. Lowi notes that, "Historically, delegation
had a rather technical meaning that emerged as the price to be paid in order
to reap the advantages of administration." Today, in contrast, delegation has
"come to be considered a good thing in itself, flowing to administrators without guides, checks, safeguards." 199 The courts, clearly, have adopted this
ideology; their adoption of it has encouraged still greater delegation. There is
no reason to believe, however, that the current prevailing assumption that
delegation is typically a benefit is superior to the earlier assumption that delegation is a cost, to be accepted only grudgingly.
This suggests the difficulty of attempting a cost-benefit analysis of congressional delegation, or of any practice, for that matter. The assignment of
costs and benefits is highly value-laden. Values differ and change. We have
already mentioned the benefits, to Congress, of broad delegation. In addition,
one could argue that the use of delegation to expedite legislative business
in the face of time constraints and public demands represents a benefit to
the public. Against this must be weighed what we take to be certain social
costs. First, excessive discretion combined with an absence of clear standards
perverts the administrative process. Administrators are made more susceptible to interest-group pressure. As Friendly puts it, "Lack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence are bound to rush; legal
vacuums are quite like physical ones in that respect."2 0 Second, excessive delegation encourages further presidential initiatives and promotes increased
199.
200.
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presidential power. Presidential action taken under authorization of blanket
delegation borders on the undemocratic. In such cases, as with economic
stabilization, the policy can barely be said to have the dual concurrence required by the Constitution. Moreover, in the absence of clear standards, the
executive action cannot be made subject to careful judicial review.
It is even more difficult to assess the potential costs and benefits of implementing a reform which limited congressional delegation. We may speculate on a few points, however. First, one potential cost to Congress is clear.
Were Congress unable to delegate so easily, it would be forced to draft the
law more carefully. As a result, it might offend some clientele interests; some
agreements might not stand. In short, life for Congressmen might become a
shade more difficult. As a result, fewer laws might be passed. This might not
be bad. As Moynihan has argued, our public policies have, to date, not coped
adequately with social complexity. 0 1 Failure should, perhaps, force humility.
More analysis and debate, in other words, rather than hasty action, may be
the best responses to complexity.
Second, to limit delegation would be to deny Congress the right to pass
responsibility on to the President. This, of course, is exactly as it should be.
The Constitution intended Congress and the President to share responsibility
for policymaking. The current congressional practice of delegation represents
an illegitimate evasion of that responsibility. Some limitation is quite desirable.
This analysis suggests that one aspect of congressional policymaking, or
the avoidance of policymaking-its practice of broad delegation-can and
should be reformed. Proposals for reform, however, must not overlook the
benefits which delegation provides for Congress. These benefits represent obstacles to the reformer and will have to be overcome.
B.

Executive Orders and Presidential Power

Even before Watergate, many commentators had detected a dramatic rise
in presidential power. This trend was tied to the decline of Congress as a
law-making body (although the direction of causality was never postulated).
Indeed, this model had an almost hydraulic simplicity: as presidential power
went up, congressional power went down. The problem with this model is its
portrayal of relations between President and Congress as a zero-sum gamethat increases in the power of one must come at the expense of the other. An
alternative assumption is possible. The range and impact of governmental activities have grown enormously. Thus if we define the "power" of these institutions in terms of their impact on society, we might well conclude that the
power of both President and Congress has increased. (If we define "authority" in terms of the trust, respect, and confidence displayed toward these institutions, we might add that the authority of both has declined).
201.
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This points to the central analytical problem. Writers are rarely precise in
discussing the power relations between President and Congress. What, exactly,
does it mean to say that the President's power in relation to Congress has
increased? A full analysis of the concept of power is hardly appropriate here.
We can, however, begin to draw some simple distinctions concerning the notion of presidential power. Following James D. Barber, we should distinguish
between presidential power as an ability to act independently of Congress,
and presidential power as an ability to make Congress do what the President
wants. 2 12 Writers have generally failed to draw this distinction, leading them
to incorrect conclusions.
There is extensive evidence that Presidents have enjoyed surprisingly little
of the second type of power. As a rule, that is, they have not been able to get
Congress to obey their will, especially in domestic policymaking. Although it is
not entirely clear, this power of the President may actually have declined in
recent years.
Much has been made of the rise of presidential initiative in law-making.
The key, of course, is the extent to which Congress approves presidential
proposals. Here, Presidents have not enjoyed great success, at least not in
domestic policy. Thus, from 1938 until his death, Roosevelt failed to secure a
single piece of significant domestic legislation. 20 Truman was defeated on
most of his domestic policy proposals, except perhaps in housing. 204 Eisen20 5
hower failed in his general policy of limiting government action.
Polsby analyzed the fate of presidential proposals from 1954 to 1963. He
found that, "In general, between one-third and two-thirds of presidential
proposals are enacted in some recognizable form by Congress, with the median for [those] ten years lying well below the 50 per cent mark. ' 20 6 More
recently, Cronin has observed that, in his approximately three years in office,
Kennedy secured congressional approval for only 40 per cent of his proposals. Moreover, in the first three years of the Nixon presidency, Congress ap20 7
proved only 33 per cent of the programs requested by the White House.
These findings illustrate the difficulties faced by Presidents in their attempts to mobilize Congress. The most notable presidential successes seem to
occur in times of crisis-Franklin Roosevelt's Hundred Days, for example, or
after John Kennedy's assassination. At other times, Presidents have not found
Congress to be especially pliant. In fact, the Congress has provided several
major examples of its own policy initiatives-the space program in the 1950's,
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health care reform in the 1960's,208 economic stabilization and planning in
the 1970's.
At the same time, however, the recent history of executive orders shows
that presidential power of the first type-the ability to act independently of
Congress-has remained great, and has perhaps even increased. Indeed, we
might propose a tentative hypothesis: that Presidents have come to rely on
executive orders in order to make up for their inability to mobilize Congress.
Experience demonstrates that Presidents can expect the support of the courts.
Thus when they seek a particular policy, but doubt their ability to move it
through Congress, they can simply attempt to achieve that aim through an
executive order. The history of policymaking in civil rights provides, as we
have seen, the most notable example.
Several related factors, in particular, make executive orders especially attractive policymaking tools for a President. First is speed. Even if a President
is reasonably confident of securing desired legislation from Congress, he must
wait for congressional deliberations to run their course. Invariably, he can
achieve far faster, if not immediate, results by issuing an executive order.
Moreover, when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate. Second is flexibility. Executive
orders have the force of law. Yet they differ from congressional legislation in
that a President can alter any executive order simply with the stroke of his
pen-merely by issuing another executive order. As noted earlier, Presidents
have developed the system of classifying national security documents in precisely this manner.20 9 Finally, executive orders allow the President, not only to
evade hardened congressional opposition, but also to preempt potential or
growing opposition-to throw Congress off balance, to reduce its ability to
formulate a powerful opposing position.
Each of these factors was manifested in Gerald Ford's Executive Order No.
11905, which restructured the management of the country's foreign intelligence agencies. 21 0 Throughout 1975, committees in the House and Senate investigated the intelligence agencies and considered reform proposals. Toward
the end of the year, their efforts began to falter. In December, the chief of
the CIA station in Athens was assassinated. In January 1976, Congress became mired in controversy when the report of the House Intelligence Committee was leaked to the press. In February, the President acted. He issued an
executive order which, he said, would "eliminate abuses and questionable activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies while at the same time
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permitting them to get on with their vital work of gathering and assessing
inform ation.

21

,

This order achieved several aims for the President. First, it won public
support for him. In particular, he appeared, through this order, to be both as
eager for reform and more decisive than Congress. He created the impression
that he was "carrying out by executive action many of those very reforms
upon which Congress embarked through the legislative process.

2

12

Second,

'213

he "stole the march
on Congress by creating his own Board of Overseers
for foreign intelligence. A central issue in the reform effort had been creation
of a new oversight mechanism. By taking this moderate action, and enlisting
some public and congressional support for it, the President made agreement
by an already confused Congress on more severe oversight measures less
likely. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the executive order actually
authorized a wide range of domestic activities by the foreign intelligence
agencies. By combining broad prohibitions with a series of more specific
exceptions, the order gave, for the first time, clear authorization for domestic intelligence gathering-precisely the sorts of activities which the congressional committees had originally been formed to investigate and which
those committees had been expected to restrict through legislation. 2 14 In the
end, Executive Order No. 11905 succeeded remarkably in undermining the
prospects for legislative reform of the intelligence establishment. As one top
CIA official was quoted as saying, "I hate to say this, but I think we've won
2 15

too much.1

Executive orders, then, have become a critical weapon in the arsenal of
presidential policymaking. Yet, it must be remembered that they may be used
primarily to compensate for inadequacies elsewhere. Thus executive orders
have certainly contributed to presidential strength, but, in a sense, they are a
reflection of presidential weakness.
C.

Executive Orders and Democratic Theory

A few principles are central to the American concept of democracy. Most
basic is a commitment to the rule of law, to the belief that policy should be
enacted only according to constitutional procedures. Adherence to these procedures promotes democratic values. Dual concurrence in legislation, the sharing of powers, checks the abuse of governmental power. The careful assignment of functions increases accountability to the public.
Executive orders are a challenge to democratic theory. Their extensive
211. Stern and Pincus, Backing Awvayrom the FBI and CIA, Durham Morning Herald, April 22,
1976, at 4, col 3 (quoting President Ford).
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use by recent Presidents undermines democratic decision procedures, and
threatens the rule of law. Instead, they create a system of what Borosage has
neatly labelled "para-laws". These, he observes:
• . .are the internal regulations of the bureaucracy, premised upon a claim to

inherent power, a grant of a broad and uncharted power from the legislature,
or simply established without reference to any legal basis. The para-legal gives
the appearance of legality and regulation by law to executive agencies, without the reality of legislative determination and definition. 216
Such a system provides policy quickly and decisively. By evading the Congress, however, it sacrifices accountability and consent. In short, it replaces
government by law with rule by orders.
Thus there exists a tension between the values of speed and accountability.
The demand for decisiveness conflicts with the need for deliberation. 21 7 Interestingly, a belief in the independent value of speed in decision-making is of
relatively recent origin. It is certainly not what the framers intended. As
Brandeis remarked in Myers v. United States: the intent of the Constitution was
"not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.

21 8

The danger today is not from aristocracy, but from autocracy. The rise of
presidential legislation removes the traditional safeguards against the exercise
of arbitrary power. In return, it is not even clear that the public has received
the benefits of more enlightened policy. We have already challenged the assumption of a positive value in speed of decision-making, as such. In other
words, in the face to social complexity, the most desirable reform may be a
return to constitutional principles.
III
THE PROBLEM OF REFORM

Proposals for reform must be based on an analysis of the supposed problem. In this paper, we have identified what we consider to be a problem of
American government, and suggested that it is subject to change, if not complete solution. We recognize, however, that there are many reasons, both
good and bad, for the evolution of this problem. These reasons represent
obstacles in the pathway to reform.
For example, we have argued that a major cause of presidential legislation
is the tendency of Congress to delegate its own legislative power broadly.
Broad delegation enables Congress to cope with immediate political pressures.
216.
217.
218.
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Thus Congress can be expected to resist attempts at reform. Accordingly, reformers will have either to induce the public to alter the nature of its political
demands, or induce Congress to respond to those demands in a different
manner.
Similarly, we have argued that the courts have encouraged presidential
legislation by refusing to overturn either congressional delegations or executive orders. What has emerged is a pattern of judicial deference to presidential actions. Corwin suggests two reasons for this tendency. First, the courts
have always recognized that they cannot coerce compliance from the executive
branch. Thus, except for the most extreme cases, they tend to avoid confrontations. Second, the conferral of powers described in article III of the Constitution closely resembles that of article II. Thus a broad interpretation of
article II seems to imply a broad interpretation of article 111.21 9 Acceptance
of presidential power promotes acceptance of judicial authority. Thus there is
some reason to expect the courts to resist significant change. Yet, it is also
true that the courts respond to change in public ideology and opinion. Surely,
their support for executive initiative in the last thirty years has been due, in
part, to their belief that the public demanded it. Accordingly, the best means
of moving the courts to reform might be to demonstrate the limitations of the
prevailing ideology, and work to create broad support for a new approach.
The problem of presidential legislation results from an interaction of the
Executive, Congress, the courts, and the public. Reform must seek to alter the
behavior of each.
A.

The Executive

The framers appreciated the inclination of powerful political leaders to
seek still greater power. Accordingly, they attempted to pit institutions against
each other, to use shared ambition as means of restraint. Until relatively recently, such skepticism about the motives of political leaders had been common. It suggests to the reformer that he not expect voluntary self-restraint by
any political institution or leader, especially one which has already grown as
large as the Presidency. With this in mind, we can propose several means of
controlling presidential legislation.
First, Congress should draft standards to regulate the publication of executive orders. The existing orders and legislation concerning executive orders fail to provide such standards. They simply spell out procedures which
the President should follow if he decides to publish the order. The failure to
provide such standards has led to yet another paradox: the federal establishment has grown greatly in the last forty years; the President is in control of a

much larger bureaucracy. Yet the number of published orders has declined.
Clearly, there are many substantive directives being issued, but not published.
219.

E. CORWIN, supra note 84, at 175-176.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 40: No. 3

Some must, no doubt, remain classified on national security grounds. Others
are more questionable.
There is no question of eliminating executive orders entirely. They have
been legitimated by the courts, and have the force of law. Moreover, when
issued under proper constitutional and congressional authorization, they are
essential to effective administration. The need is to increase the President's
accountability for the orders he issues. The first step toward improved accountability is stricter rules for, and hence increased, publication.
A second step would be for Congress to draft stricter standards concerning the sources of authority claimed by individual executive orders. Orders
often appeal vaguely to the "Constitution" or "statutes" as sources of authority. This invites judicial construction of sources of authority, and continued
presidential initiatives without clear congressional and constitutional mandate.
In the future, orders should be required to specify the explicit source or
sources of authority under which they have been issued.
Also, the courts will have to become less deferential to presidential initiatives. We have seen cases in which the courts constructed authorization for
executive orders which, themselves, claimed only the flimsiest bases of support. In so doing, the courts provided precedent and encouragement for
further initiatives. In the future, the courts should demand more precise appeals to constitutional and congressional authority. They should save their
ingenuity for other endeavors. The courts cannot, of course, be coerced into
taking such measures. Change will result only from the emergence of a demand for reform.
B.

Congress

Congress is the most venerable target of reform in the federal government. It remains, today, essentially what it was in Woodrow Wilson's time-a
diverse collection of self-seeking individuals. In the absence of strong party
leadership, Congress lacks an effective mechanism of central coordination; the
fate of legislation is subject largely to the initiative of individuals. It is not
surprising, then, that the analysis and critique of Congress, today, is essentially what it was for Wilson: Congress, it is generally agreed, needs stronger
220
leadership.
It is clear that Congress has encouraged presidential law-making, as much
through broad delegations as through inaction or silence. Inaction, we have
argued, may result from deep divisions which take time to resolve, or from
minority obstruction. This is exactly as the Constitution intended. Presidential
legislation in the face of such inaction must be considered, on its face, an
example of intrusion into the prerogatives of Congress. In contrast, the con-
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gressional practice of delegation borders on the abdication of power so feared
by the separation doctrine. Thus Congress must either be induced or coerced
into curbing its inclination to delegate.
The movement to reform Congress has already begun. Early results suggest that it has not succeeded entirely in overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of that institution. For the purposes of this discussion, two related steps
are essential. First, Congress must limit the generosity of its delegations to the
executive. Second, it must become more diligent in drafting those delegations
-stricter, in other words, in providing clear policy and standards to guide
executive action. There are at least two possible means of promoting such
change.
First, reform can perhaps be encouraged. It has been argued that insufficient resources and inadequate staffs are, in part, responsible for the
haphazard style of congressional bill-drafting. This argument, of course, is
also used to explain the "decline" of Congress. Since we have challenged the
belief that Congress has, in fact, declined, we should also treat this argument
with some skepticism. In particular, this argument seems to understate both
22 1
the expertise and influence of congressional staffs in formulating policy.
Yet there seems no good reason not to improve the information gathering
and analytical capacity of Congress. It may have the important direct consequence of tightening up legislation. It may also have valuable indirect effects.
For example, it could help improve both the public image of Congress and
the morale of Congressmen. This, in turn, might raise the expectations concerning congressional performance among both the public and Congressmen.
If so, it could encourage better performance.
The development of the Congressional Budget Office may ultimately
prove illuminating in this respect. It represents an attempt by Congress to
improve its analytical ability and to coordinate appropriations. The early reviews of the performance of the Budget Office have been tentative, but generally favorable. 22 2 Success in this reform can only improve the prestige of
Congress, and perhaps encourage it to attempt other means to improve
policymaking.
Second, the non-delegation doctrine should be revived. 223 Davis is surely
correct in observing that the doctrine has failed to prevent excessive delegations of congressional legislative power. Yet, his proposal that the doctrine be
abandoned entirely seems premature, especially since he sees the doctrine as
being replaced primarily by the hope of voluntary rule-making by agencies in
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224
the executive branch.

The responsibility here belongs to the courts. As Lowi has argued, the
courts must force Congress to perform the task assigned it by the Constitution. 22 5 Through their power to overturn legislation, they must coerce constitutional lawmaking.
C.

Courts

The task for the courts, therefore, is clear. Rather than construct authorization for baseless executive orders, they must demand that the executive
specify its sources of authority. Rather than construct standards in broad delegation, they must demand that Congress provide them, for surely, if the
Supreme Court can require an administrative agency, which must act according to congressionally approved procedures, to specify the sources of its
power to act in a particular manner (as it did in S.E.C. v. Chener'),2 26 then the
obligation to impose such a constraint on the President himself, who may act
without procedural requirements, is considerably greater. The courts themselves undermine judicial review when they construct the guidelines which the
other branches either refuse to provide or are unable to find. The pursuit of
accountability is futile if the courts act as a willing accomplice in the attempts
of the other two branches to escape it.
The courts have apparently been sympathetic to the substance of presidential policy initiatives. Thus they have been somewhat lax in ensuring that procedural safeguards be maintained. We now appreciate the dangers inherent in
a retreat from law. The courts possess the tools to reconstruct it.
D.

The Public

In several ways, post-Watergate politics resembles that of the Progressive
era: in their shared desire for neutral competence; in their ambivalence toward executive leadership; in their discomfort with the concept of power. It
seems fitting, therefore, to conclude with an appeal to the public-in particular, with an appeal for a more enlightened public opinion.
Participation is a defining characteristic of democracy. Formal mechanisms
of accountability are of little value unless the public uses them to oversee the
performance of government. Ultimately, the most effective restraint on power
may be a vigilant public-a public not satisfied with symbolic assurances, a
public sensitive to the interplay of political forces, and attentive to potential
threats to democratic procedures. Thus today, as always, involvement by an
astute public is essential for harnessing democratic political institutions.
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CONCLUSION

The Constitution expects both conflict and cooperation between President
and Congress. Presidential legislation enables the executive to escape conflict
and avoid cooperation. It undermines democratic norms when it enacts policy
without full concurrence or accountability. Executive orders cannot, and
should not, be eliminated from the practice of American government. There
must, however, be stricter standards to regulate their use.
A remedy to the problem of presidential legislation, then, lies in a return
to constitutional principles. This will necessarily involve some limitation on the
scope of executive action-in particular, on the ability of Presidents to act
independently of Congress. In this sense, only, will it reduce the power of the
President; it will not impair the ability of the President to influence Congress
legitimately. More importantly, it offers an opportunity to increase public
trust and respect for government by restoring the branches of government to
their proper constitutional roles. In this sense, a return to constitutional principles will increase the authority of both President and Congress.

